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ABSTRACT: Global value chains (GVCs) have been proliferating in the world 
economy to involve more and more countries and industries, thus combining 
the comparative advantages of the participating countries. It is therefore in-
creasingly difficult to determine how a country participates in international 
production. New databases, which try to trace the impact of GVCs, come to the 
fore. Based on these statistics, the participation of the East Central European 
countries, and among them Hungary is completely different from what tradi-
tional statistics show. These countries are specialised mainly in labour inten-
sive production phases. Their geographic position, inherited capacities and 
skills, as well as their international economic integration explain that speciali-
sation. GVCs shape the international environment, which deeply influences the 
framework conditions for the economic growth and catching-up of less devel-
oped economies. Post-crisis changes point to new factors and developments, 
which may change the GVCs future and thus provide challenges for countries, 
deeply involved in GVCs, such as the East Central European countries. 
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Introduction 
Global value chains (GVCs), in which the different stages of the produc-
tion processes are located across different locations, have proliferated at 
unprecedented speed in certain industries and sectors in the world econ-
omy. They influence developments in international production, trade and 
investments to a greater and greater extent. Furthermore, they create a dif-
ferent from the previous environment for less developed countries for 
their catching-up efforts. This article is aimed at presenting this develop-
ment and calling attention to the changes in the catching-up opportunities 
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of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, among them Hungary, in 
this new environment. The article relies on the results of the international 
literature in order to describe and illustrate the process in question. 
The article is organised as follows. First, the definitions and the the-
oretical background are presented. The next chapter deals with the main 
facts and trends in the world economy in the area of global value chains. 
This part is followed by a section, which underlines the main aspects from 
the point of view of catching-up. Then we turn our attention to East Cen-
tral Europe and try to present the main findings of research concerning 
GVCs and delineate changing directions after the crisis. The last part con-
cludes and contains consequences for economic policy. 
Definitions, theoretical background, factors 
Scholars have different approaches to describe and analyse how firms or-
ganise their activities, increasingly internationally. Basically, the same 
phenomenon of fragmenting or cutting up the production process and lo-
cating the various activities to different locations (where they can be car-
ried out the most efficiently or at lower costs) induced scholars to intro-
duce concepts such as the global commodity chain, global production net-
works and global value chains. These describe the same phenomenon, 
with different analytical approaches and emphasis (for a comprehensive 
review of the GVC literature see e.g. Hernandez–Pedersen, 2017). We 
here rely on the concept of global value chains (GVCs). The value chain 
approach relies on the concept that the various entities, which participate 
in production, may be connected to each other and they create a value, 
which can be a source of competitive advantage (Gereffi–Lee, 2012). 
When the value chain becomes international, embracing locations in many 
countries or global, embracing locations in various continents, they can be 
described as global value chains (Giroud–Mirza, 2015). There are various 
definitions in the literature. According to The Duke University’s Global 
Value Chain Initiative:  
“The value chain describes the full range of activities that firms and work-
ers do to bring a product/good or service from its conception to its end 
use and beyond. This includes activities such as design, production, mar-
keting, distribution and support to the final consumer.” … “A value chain 
can be contained within a single geographic location or even a single firm 
(think about a fruit that is grown, packaged, sold and consumed within 
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one country). A global value chain is divided among multiple firms and 
geographic spaces.”3 
There are various other concepts introduced in the literature in con-
nection with GVCs. GVCs can be simple or complex based on the number 
of border crossings: in simple GVCs value added crosses borders only 
once during the production process, while in complex GVCs, value added 
crosses borders more than once (Wang et al., 2017). This helps us to dif-
ferentiate for example “simple” offshoring or outsourcing from produc-
tion, where a whole network of firms participates. A similar distinction is 
between “snakes” and “spiders” (Baldwin and Venables, 2013), depend-
ing on the sequence of production: in snakes, intermediate goods are sent 
from country to country until they are transformed into final products. In 
spiders, there is a network of locations, sending spare parts, components, 
intermediary goods to the final destination, where these are assembled to-
gether. Of course, in real life, rather a mixture of the two types are present. 
Another important concept is upgrading, which means increasing 
value added, moving up the value chain – in the case of a specific location 
or firm. The literature differentiates between four types of upgrading 
(product, process, functional and intersectoral) (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2002). There is a problem in distinguishing the four upgrading types em-
pirically based on statistical data, but there are case studies of firms, re-
gions or countries, which show upgrading processes and types.  
Understandably, there is a difference between those types of partici-
pation in GVCs, when a firm or location mainly assembles imported in-
puts or when it exports intermediates for assembling elsewhere- to put it 
simply. That is why there is a distinction between a country’s the back-
ward and forward participation in GVCs. Backward participation is the 
extent to which the country’s exports rely on foreign, imported interme-
diate inputs, forward participation refers to the share of domestically pro-
duced intermediates exported for use in third countries (OECD, 2013). 
The theoretical background to GVCs is related to the theories of in-
ternational trade. As a number of well-known authors have demonstrated 
it, the assumptions of classical trade theories (especially that countries 
trade final products; that in an industry, producers are homogenous, and 
they operate at constant return to scale etc.) are increasingly not fulfilled 
(Inomata, 2017). Most recently, the “New New (New?) Trade Theory” 
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emphasizes the role of GVCs, when they describe nowadays’ international 
movements as the movements of or trade in tasks (Grossman–Rossi-Hans-
berg, 2008). Furthermore, they show the increased fragmentation of pro-
duction processes (Arndt–Kierzkowski, 2001), the increased trade in in-
termediates, parts and components (Yeats, 1998), or the second unbun-
dling (Baldwin, 2011), where production is cut and separated into distinct 
fragments, which are then spread around the globe – just to name a few 
from the most important concepts. Baldwin (2016) wrote about the dena-
tionalisation of comparative advantages, where there is a relocation of 
manufacturing activities from developed to a few developing countries, 
mainly China, orchestrated mainly by developed country multinationals 
and resulting in high growth rates in the second group of countries. Ac-
cording to the same author (Baldwin, 2012), in this new international pro-
duction, many countries are exporting goods at a higher level of sophisti-
cation, than what would be possible based on their mix of factors of pro-
duction. 
In these new circumstances, where countries trade in products, which 
are either not final, and thus are exported for further processing in another 
country/countries or are only partly produced by the exporter country, it 
is increasingly difficult to determine, using classical trade data, how a 
country participates in international production. Realising that, interna-
tional organisations-initiated projects for compiling new trade datasets, 
which are “designed to better inform policy makers by providing new in-
sights into the commercial relations between nations.”4 Relying on these 
new databases gives understandably more realistic results in describing 
the participation of various countries and country groups in international 
production of goods and services. When presenting the man trends in 
GVCs, we rely mainly on calculations, which are based on these new data. 
Facts and trends 
Analyses based on traditional and new databases delineate the following 
trends concerning GVCs: 
• There had been a dynamic proliferation of GVCs in the world economy 
until the crisis (World Bank Group et al, 2017; OECD, 2017); since the 
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crisis, data indicate a stagnation in the spread of GVCs until 2014 and 
the decrease in the relative shares of simple and complex GVCs at the 
expense of pure domestic production and traditional trade production 
(World Bank Group et al., 2017). 
• There are more and more industries, or rather activities and more and 
more countries affected by GVCs (UNCTAD, 2013; World Bank 
Group et al., 2017). 
• However, differences are significant in the levels of participation of the 
various countries in GVCs (Kowalski et al., 2015) and in industry or 
activity coverage (OECD, 2013). 
• Overall, value chains are more regional than global, industry charac-
teristics, product differences and the level of liberalisation of trade in-
fluence whether a value chain embraces regions in one continent (thus 
it is regional) or many continents (thus it is global) (Rugman et al., 
2009; Estevadeordal et al., 2013).  
• Thus, instead of GVCs, we can rather talk about interlinked and inter-
twined regional value chains in the world economy with three main 
hubs: the US, Asia/China and Europe/Germany (Baldwin, 2012; Di-
akantoni et al., 2017).  
• This regionalism is especially true for Europe and the European Union. 
Germany emerges as the most “networked” hub (Diakantoni et al., 
2017), where intraregional value chains were the strongest in both 1995 
and 2011 and are much stronger than extraregional value chains (based 
on the foreign value-added content of gross exports as percent of total 
value added in exports) compared to Asia, Latin America or US-Can-
ada (World Bank Group et al., 2017). 
• The new foreign trade datasets offer a clearer picture compared to tra-
ditional trade data, about how a country participates in international 
production: for example, there are differences between RCA based on 
classical and new (VA) data (OECD, 2013). 
What are the main factors promoting the proliferation  
of GVCs? 
The most important factor is understandably technology developments. 
First of all, the developments in technology have brought new, more com-
plex goods on the market and enabled the fragmentation of the production 
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process and the separation of the different parts of the production process 
from each other. Furthermore, it is development in technology, especially 
ICT, which enabled firms to organise and coordinate production, in which 
various, even faraway locations participate (OECD, WTO, World Bank, 
2014). On the other hand, technology developments made it possible to 
transport intermediates at lower costs to the next location, where the pro-
duction process continues. (Hummels, 2007)  
Thus, technology developments enable the fragmentation, separation, 
organisation of the production process and transportation of related inter-
mediates or final products, involving faraway geographic regions as well. 
Another factor helping the spread of GVCs is the liberalisation and facil-
itation of foreign trade, as intermediates cross borders at least once in in-
ternational value chains. Trade liberalisation can take many forms: multi-
lateral, regional; „distant-regional” (where countries participating in a so-
called regional trade agreement are far away from each other, even on 
different continents) or other forms of liberalisation of foreign trade, 
where special “constructions” (for example outward processing trade) act 
as substitutes for trade liberalisation (OECD, 2013). Furthermore, the 
deeper economic integration of countries has contributed to a great extent 
to the spread of GVCs – the European Union is a good example, as we 
saw above, in this case, very deep integration goes together with a regional 
organisation of production, involving member countries of the integration.  
Globalisation contributed to the spread of GVCs in other ways as 
well: the globalisation of demand, and increased competition between 
companies due to globalisation induces firms to seek lower costs and/or 
higher efficiency to increase or at least to maintain their competitiveness. 
However, according to the empirical data presented by Veugelers (2013), 
the number of GVC lead firms is not very high, but they are the larger 
ones, which drive among others value added creation. 
What factors determine how a country  
or an industry is affected by GVCs? 
The new databases provide information on the basis of which we can de-
termine the main factors, which influence the extent to which countries 
participate in GVCs. (See e.g. OECD, 2015.) Among these, the most im-
portant are:  
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• Distance to the three production hubs, listed above – distant countries 
(mainly geographically, but in a wide sense (culture, institutions etc.) 
as well) have lower chances (due to high trade costs) of getting in-
volved in GVCs. 
• The level of development of those elements of the economy, which 
play an important role in influencing trade costs and relative wage costs 
(e.g. level of infrastructure, human capital, technology etc.). 
• Similarly, participation in (regional) integrations and the level of the 
liberalisation of trade (especially with the three production hubs) is im-
portant. 
Factors differ for backward and forward participation in GVCs. Ac-
cording to OECD (2015), especially for backward integration, structural 
and policy characteristics of the economies in question matter (for forward 
integration as well, but to a lesser extent).  
As for industries: as it was already emphasized: technical-technology 
developments are of prime importance, as these determine how the vari-
ous activities and production processes in an industry can be fragmented 
and separated geographically from each other. That is why in electronics, 
automotive or garments, GVCs are more present, but they increasingly 
involve activities in other manufacturing industries, and more recently 
even in services (for example business services) (UNCTAD, 2013). Fur-
thermore, as it was mentioned, the level of liberalisation of trade in the 
goods involved matter (even “quasi-liberalisation” constructions, which 
enable lower cost trading in intermediates, such as outward processing 
trade or special economic zones).  
These factors explain why GVCs affect countries or locations and in-
dustries differently. 
The importance of GVCs for catching-up countries 
As it was already mentioned, more and more countries, among them 
emerging economies and developing countries have increasingly been 
involved in the various international value chains. Furthermore, tradi-
tionally, lead firms in international value chains are usually multination-
als of developed countries, and they carry out the activities, which add 
high value to the production process, such as R&D, design, marketing, 
distribution etc. On the other hand, activities adding lower values to the 
production process are realised by emerging and developing economy 
12  Gazdaság & Társadalom / Journal of Economy & Society – 2017/2. 
firms, many of them affiliates or subsidiaries of the former multination-
als, and a few of them independent companies. Figure 1 shows the so-
called smile-curve, which tries to capture and present graphically the 
differences in value added alongside the GVC. Thus, it is important from 
the point of view of evaluating the place and location of the various ac-
tivities in a GVC and thus to compare how the locations, where the var-
ious activities of the GVC are carried out contribute to the totality of the 
process in GVCs. As we saw, the lead firms, usually multinational com-
panies from developed countries, concentrate on and thus retain in their 
home countries higher value activities, while the low-value added as-
sembling activities are usually relocated to lower wage developing or 
emerging economies.  
The relocation of certain processes is realised through offshoring (to 
own subsidiaries or affiliates) and offshore outsourcing (to independent 
companies abroad) (Contractor et al., 2010). As it is apparent from Fig-
ure 1, compared to the sixties-seventies, the smile curve has been smiling 
more and more as time passes. This means that differences in value-added 
have become much larger between the “bottom” activities (assembling, 
manufacturing), carried out usually in developing and emerging econo-
mies and the “top” activities at the two sides of the smile curve (R&D, 
design, manufacturing of high-value parts, sales, distribution, after-sale 
services).  
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Figure 1: Smile-curve: smiling more and more? 
Source: Kwan, 2004 
However, more recently, numerous firms originating from emerging 
or developing economies, organised and established their international 
value chains, which actually was one reason behind their quick emergence 
in the international arena (Ramamurti, Singh, 2009; Peng, 2012 for Chi-
nese multinationals). Even a few CEE multinationals are on the way to 
join this “club”, as there is evidence of relocation of labour-intensive ac-
tivities to lower wage countries (e.g. Sass, 2015 in the CEE electronics 
industry). However, developed country lead firms are still much more nu-
merous than emerging lead multinationals in GVCs. 
On the basis of the above described processes, authors call the atten-
tion to a new division of production, in which headquarter economies and 
factory economies participate (Baldwin and Gonzalez, 2013). However, 
due to the emergence of emerging lead firms from emerging economies, 
the group of headquarter economies have become relatively more hetero-
geneous over time.  
This special distribution of GVC-related activities among countries 
at the different level of development is the reason why the development 
impacts of global value chains are analysed in the theoretical and empiri-
cal literature.  
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There are numerous benefits connected to the proliferation of inter-
national value chains in less developed countries: first of all, this makes it 
easier for both firms and countries to be involved in international trade, 
without the need to develop a complete industry base (Baldwin, 2011; 
Kowalski et al., 2015). Furthermore, there is a direct and indirect employ-
ment impact (UNCTAD, 2013). Less developed countries usually have a 
large supply of low- to medium-skilled workers at considerably lower 
wages compared to developed countries. Providing employment opportu-
nities for them and for those working in ancillary industries and services 
is another benefit. Additionally, local(ly owned) firms may also benefit 
from their contacts with the lead firms or other participant firms in value 
chains. They may increase their productivity, move to higher value activ-
ities, get access to large markets etc.  
However, these gains are not automatic (OECD, WTO, Workd Bank, 
2014). For example, nowadays, the involvement in international value 
chains is different from the previous periods: it is more fragile, and pro-
vides less independence for the participating less developed firms and 
countries due to the high sensitivity to wage levels and thus high foot-
looseness of lead and participating firms. Furthermore, the jobs created in 
international value chains are in many cases of inferior quality (see e.g. 
Plank, Staritz, 2013). Furthermore, local(ly-owned) firms have limited 
possibilities for getting involved and after involvement for upgrading in 
international value chains. It happens quite often that a country or a firm 
get stuck at a lower level of value-added. Empirical studies show, that 
catch-up effects are heterogeneous concerning both companies and coun-
tries in OECD global value chains (see e.g. Criscuolo, Timmis, 2017). 
Furthermore, developed country firms have to deal with increased com-
petition for the ability to control intellectual property rights related to in-
novation and other areas. Furthermore, it is important to note the barely 
researched question of ownership and GVC governance, which may mat-
ter from the point of view of the development impact of GVCs – given the 
home country bias of multinational companies, which is well-documented 
in case studies, but not found to be robust in empirical studies (Resmini, 
Marzetti, 2016). 
Thus the consequences of the proliferation of GVCs for income dis-
tribution in the world economy or at the level of a certain country may be 
problematic, and this affects both developed and developing countries. 
First, certain groups of workers are negatively affected (e.g. low-skilled 
workers in developed countries: by losing their jobs and by a downward 
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pressure on their wages; see e.g. de Medeiros, Trebat, 2014). and second, 
the number and value-added of jobs is not so important any more, but their 
quality is what counts (World Bank Group et al., 2017). The scope and 
manoeuvring room for economic policy is limited, however, it can in-
crease the benefits and reduce the costs of being involved in international 
value chains. This can be done mainly through investing into the enabling 
factors (especially in those activities, which first, support the engagement 
in international value chains, and then, which support and enable the var-
ious types of upgrading: education, training, skills improvement etc.). 
Furthermore, it can help local companies first in getting involved in inter-
national value chains, and second, in upgrading. Here however, another 
problem emerges: the increased use of offshore or quasi offshore jurisdic-
tions for tax avoidance and tax optimisation purposes by GVC-related 
multinational companies. This leads to a considerable tax base erosion in 
both headquarter and factory economies, which on one hand reduces their 
ability to help the groups hurt by the changes, and on the other hand, to 
spend more on the enabling factors. 
East-Central Europe and Hungary: participation in GVCs 
The East-Central European countries, and among them Hungary are in-
volved to a great extent mainly in European value chains, especially in 
certain industries. They are now less involved in traditional labour-inten-
sive industries, such as clothing –apparel, which are already gone except 
for the high value-added segments (Hunya, Sass, 2014); and more in the 
various electronics and automotive sub-industries. Countries differ in 
their specialisation in sub-industries. Empirical studies show that the ex-
port growth of Central and Eastern European countries relies to a great 
extent on imported inputs (OECD, 2017) and the high share of intermedi-
ates in the exports and imports of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Po-
land (World Bank Group et al., 2017). New datasets show how spectacu-
larly increased electronics and automotive exports of these countries are 
related to GVC activities. They also underline the dominance of backward 
(as opposed to forward) integration of these countries into GVCs (OECD, 
2013).  
These countries participate especially in regional value chains, led 
first of all by German (World Bank Group et al., 2017) and Western Eu-
16  Gazdaság & Társadalom / Journal of Economy & Society – 2017/2. 
ropean multinationals, and thus they play an important role in maintain-
ing/improving the international competitiveness of these MNCs (see e.g. 
Rahman, Zhao, 2013). The countries in question carry out mainly activi-
ties, which can be characterised by lower value-added, positioned at the 
bottom of the smile curve. However, there had been traces and sings of 
upgrading – at least before the crisis (Sass, Szalavetz, 2013; Demeter, 
Szász, 2016; Sass, 2015 in electronics). The related income transfer re-
mained limited (Szalavetz, 2017), i.e. in spite of carrying out activities, 
which add higher value to the product, the local subsidiaries of multina-
tional companies could not get a higher slice from the total value of the 
output. Furthermore, there was only a limited number of local firms, 
which could benefit in terms of becoming part of the value chain (see e.g. 
Pavlínek, 2015 for the automotive industry or the meta-analysis of Iwa-
saki and Tokunaga, 2017). Similarly, only a very limited number of CEE 
companies could become lead firms of international value chains (which 
can be proxied by the low number of multinational companies in the 
“GVC-affected” industries, see e.g. Sass, 2015 for electronics). 
This high GVC (or rather regional value chains) involvement can be 
explained by the geographical position of these countries, i.e. being close 
to one of the “GVC-hubs”, Germany. Their inherited capacities (relatively 
cheap, low-to-mid-skilled labour) and their membership in a deep eco-
nomic integration all contributed to their high involvement in mainly Eu-
ropean value chains.  
New developments after the crisis? 
After the crisis, the above listed GVC-promoting factors are still strong 
(or de novo strong): on one hand, technical-technological developments 
enabled further fragmentation of the production processes and induced 
further decreases in various GVC-related costs (such as ICT-costs, trans-
portation costs etc.). While trade liberalisation has not gone further at the 
world economy level, there is an increased number of regional trade 
agreements. These are less and less regional (concluded between countries 
or country groups, which are geographically far away from each other – 
see UNCTAD (2015), which shows the increased geographical distance 
among the members of preferential trade agreements; and contain more 
and more elements important from the point of view of facilitating GVC-
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related foreign trade. For example, Ruta (2017) showed, how the land-
scape of preferential trade agreements has changed with the dominance of 
agreements covering more and more policy areas. UNCTAD (2015) pre-
sented how the “depth” of the preferential trade agreements increased. 
Furthermore, there are new countries (and new companies) involved in 
GVC-related trade. 
However, there are also new factors, which have come to the fore and 
may affect the proliferation of global and regional value chains negatively. 
First of all, wages increased considerably in the so-called factory countries 
(De Backer, Flaig, 2017). Transportation risks are also larger in certain 
areas, for example in Asia due to political tensions. Certain offshoring and 
relocation failures or increased economic nationalism may induce firms 
to relocate activities back to their home countries, which were previously 
offshored to faraway locations. And most importantly, technological ad-
vancements in the areas of digitalisation, robotisation and automation, or 
Industrie 4.0 in short, may induce fundamental changes in the global and 
regional organisation of production processes, and thus change to a great 
extent GVC-related offshoring and outsourcing of activities. Thus, the 
need to relocate activities to locations with cheaper labour force may be-
come less relevant. There may be a reshoring (to home economies of mul-
tinationals) and backshoring (closer to the home economies of multina-
tionals) process induced by these changes. 
Some traces of this new era can already be seen in the world economy 
and in Europe as well. As for the world economy, World Bank Group et 
al. (2017) showed that the crisis basically halted the further spread of 
GVCs, both simple and complex ones and there has been an increase in 
pure domestic production and especially in traditional trade production. 
In Europe, as we saw, there had increasingly been established a German 
„headquarter economy” and East-Central European „factory economy” up 
till the crisis. Also, this process came to a halt, according to World Bank 
Group et al. (2017). Comparing foreign value added embedded in bilateral 
manufactured exports in 2005, 2011 and 2015, the increased “hub”-role 
of Germany disappeared between 2011 and 2015. The 2015 network of 
European production based on this measure seems to be much more sim-
ilar to that in 2005 than in 2011. Another sign of the increased impact of 
the Industrie 4.0 can be traced in the case of the electronics industry (Sass, 
2015). That may be the explanation why there is halt in the relocation 
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process of capacities to lower-wage member countries, which was preva-
lent until the crisis. Furthermore, there is a clear divergence among the 
“old” EU Member States in terms of the size of the electronics capacities 
they host. Certain high wage old members (e.g. Germany, Italy, Sweden) 
increased their shares in total EU electronics output and value added, 
mainly at the expense of other “old” EU-members (e.g. the UK or Ireland). 
Thus, the new focus of analysis may be the identification and explanation 
of these new processes and their consequences for GVCs. 
Conclusion 
This short essay paper showed the proliferation of GVCs, or rather re-
gional and global value chains in the world economy. Up until the crisis, 
they grew at a high pace and embraced more and more countries and in-
dustries. While the benefits of GVC-involvement for catch-up countries 
are not automatic, they can still provide an impetus for growth and devel-
opment of less developed countries and the benefits can be “helped” to 
occur through economic policy measures.  
The East Central European countries are deeply involved mainly in 
European, regional value chains. The spectacular growth of their electron-
ics and automotive exports is clearly related to their GVC-involvement. 
Through this they contribute strongly to the improvement or maintenance 
of the competitiveness of Western European (mainly German) multina-
tional companies. The development impacts of GVCs are rarely analysed 
in these countries. There are some signs of upgrading at the local subsid-
iaries of multinational companies, with no related income transfer. The 
impact on local firms remained limited. The experience of these countries 
may illustrate that GVCs provide opportunities for catching-up, but it is 
easy to be stuck at a lower level of value added. Economic policy and 
ownership may matter… 
The article emphasized the changes present in the post-crisis environ-
ment, where new developments may reduce considerably the role of 
GVCs and regional value chains. Industry 4.0 may render it less important 
to relocate labour-intensive production processes to lower-wage coun-
tries, which may initiate a new reorganisation of international production. 
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